In projecting global food demand to 2050, much attention has been given to rising demand due to the projected population increase from the current 7.4 billion to more than 9 billion. An increasingly important source of the increase in food demand is per capita demand growth induced by rising income per person. Since the proportion of income spending on food decreases as incomes rise, growth in global food demand will be greater if incomes grow faster in developing countries than in high-income countries. Such a pattern of income convergence has become established in recent years, making it important to assess the implications for food demand and supply. Using a resource-based measure of food that accounts for the much higher production costs associated with dietary upgrading, this paper concludes that per capita demand growth is likely to be a more important driver of food demand than population growth between now and 2050. Using the middle-ground International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Shared Socioeconomic Pathway projections to 2050, which assume continued income convergence, the paper finds that the increase in food demand (102 percent) would be roughly a third greater than without convergence (78 percent). Since the impact of convergence on the supply side is much more muted, convergence puts upward pressure on world food prices, partially offsetting a baseline trend toward falling world food prices to 2050.
3 technologies and by catching up with the leading economies. However, the earlier literature found that economies did not converge unconditionally. While several studies found evidence of convergence among today's industrial countries (e.g., Baumol 1986; Dowrick and Nguyen 1989) , there was little evidence of convergence in broader groups of countries (e.g., Ben-David 1993 , 1994 . In fact, Pritchett (1997) concluded that the dominant feature of economic growth since the 19 th century had been 'income divergence, big time', with initially poorer countries growing much less rapidly than the more advanced countries.
More recently, however, there appears to have been a major improvement in the growth prospects of developing countries (Baldwin 2016; Dervis 2012; Korotayev, Zinkina, Bogevolnov and Malkov 2011) . Dervis (2012) identified a 'new convergence' as having commenced around 1990, with more rapid growth in emerging and developing economies relative to advanced economies. Baldwin (2016) argues that a 'Great Convergence' is under way, with developedcountry firms unbundling production stages and moving labor-intensive components of production to low-wage countries, allowing developing countries to industrialize without building entire supply chains from scratch. He also notes that many of the opportunities created by this convergence have been exploited by relatively-large developing countries. This is in sharp contrast with the experience of the 1970s, when the most rapid growth was in relatively small economies such as Hong Kong SAR, China; the Republic of Korea; Singapore; and Taiwan, China.
Whether economic convergence has major implications for world food demand is an important question if we are to fulfill the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Several of the 17 SDGs, including goals to end poverty and hunger, to promote inclusive economic growth and to reduce inequality within and between countries, pertain directly to the convergence and food demand question. For instance, if the world is successful in substantially raising the incomes of the poor during the time horizon of the SDGs (2015 SDGs ( -2030 and beyond, what would be the impact on world food demand and supply? If populous middle-income countries continue to grow and upgrade their diets, will this put strong upward pressure on world food prices, potentially even threatening the access of some poor people to essential foods? This question was framed by Pan Yotopoulos (1985) in the aftermath of the food price crisis of the 1970s, but it is not clear that we are much better placed to answer it now than we were more than thirty years ago.
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Substantial efforts have been made in the modeling community to forecast the global supply and demand for food to the middle of the century, typically using large global agricultural models. 2 However, the projections for food output and prices vary widely across the models, depending on their underlying supply and demand specifications, choices of key parameters such as price and income elasticities and their treatments of technical change. For instance, reviewing modeling approaches from twelve global agricultural economic models, report that modelers' projections for increases in global crop output between 2005 and 2050 range from 52 percent to 116 percent, while estimated changes in crop prices vary from a decline of 16% to a rise of 46% (Table 2, p. 429).
Surveying the literature on the relationship between income distribution and food demand, Cirera and Masset (2010) conclude that most existing models for projecting food demand fail to incorporate sufficient Engel flexibility, except for some models with flexible demand systems such as an Implicitly Directly Additive Demand System (AIDADS) (Rimmer and Powell 1996) . An important new paper by Gouel and Guimbard (2017) , which uses the highly-flexible Modified Implicitly Directly Additive Demand System (MAIDADS), projects an increase of 95 percent in consumption of animal-based food, as against an 18 percent increase in demand for starchy staples, with the latter being largely driven by population growth towards 2050.
One way to disentangle the divergent results from modeling is to focus on a small number of key economic drivers that affect long-run crop output, price and land use changes. Pioneering work in this direction was undertaken by Hertel (2011) and See Cirera and Masset (2010) , Hertel, Baldos and van der Mensbrugghe (2016) , Lampe et al. (2014) , and Valin et al. (2014) for reviews. 3 After specifying distributions for the underlying parameters and drivers of demand and supply, undertake a Monte Carlo analysis and find a very broad range of potential outcomes for their global variables. They find that about 72 percent of the outcomes foreshadow a crop price decline while the remaining 28 percent correspond to price rises between 2050 (Figure 11 .7).
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The objective of this paper is to explore the evolution of world food demand and supply to 2050, extending a simple econometric model developed by Fukase and Martin (2016) . In Fukase and Martin (2016) , this model allowed us to assess the prospects for net import demand for food in China. Here, we extend our approach to the global level and focus on the implications of income convergence on long-term food demand and supply. On the demand side, per capita consumption of the aggregate food is modeled as a function of real income only, with a functional form developed to allow for consumption that asymptotically approaches a ceiling level Rask 2004, 2011) . On the supply side, we specify a production equation as a function of real income and agricultural land endowment per capita. This enables us to estimate a simple relationship between the productivity-driven growth of income per capita, declining per capita availability of agricultural land, and the growth of food output for each country.
Following Yotopoulos (1985) and Rask (2004, 2011) , we convert all food items into a resource-based measure of food, a cereal equivalent (CE). The key advantages of the CE demand model (Fukase and Martin 2016; Rask and Rask 2011) are its parsimony and transparency.
It accounts for the greater agricultural resource requirements associated with dietary upgrading, in particular, the resources required to produce animal-based products (e.g., cropland to produce feedstuff and pastures to graze animals). In our analysis, we consider only non-price influences on supply and demand, evaluating both consumption and production in cereal equivalent quantities.
We then use a gap approach, i.e., examining the implications of different income growth scenarios for gaps in supply and demand for food and the resulting pressures on food prices.
Following this introduction, the second section examines the relationship between income growth, population growth and demand for food. The third section quantifies the extent of income convergence and its impact on food demand. The fourth section presents the relationship between economic growth, land availability and the supply of food. The fifth section projects supply and demand of food towards 2050 and considers the implications of income convergence for the supply-demand balance and for food prices. The final section presents a brief conclusion.
Modeling Food Demand
Because we focus on the impacts of economic growth and convergence, we first examine the pattern of economic growth since 1992. Figure 1 shows the evolution of annual per capita GDP 6 growth rates in 2005 constant prices by 'high-income' and 'developing' countries 4 between 1980 and 2013 (World Bank 2015 . The figure shows that the high-income countries as a group grew faster than developing countries in the 1980s, at 2.4 percent and 1.8 percent per year respectively. By contrast, average growth for developing countries in the 1990s, at 3.0 percent, exceeded that for high-income countries at 1.7 percent. In the first decade of the new millennium, the growth rate for developing countries was 3.8 percent, well ahead of the 1.2 percent growth rate in highincome countries. Higher economic growth in developing countries has potentially important implications on food demand, given the declining share of income spent on food as incomes rise.
To evaluate how food consumption patterns evolve with income growth, we consider two measures of food consumption, namely, cereal equivalents (CE) (Yotopoulos 1985; Rask 2004, 2011) and calorie measures. Cereal equivalent measures convert foods into cereal equivalents in terms of their dietary energy equivalents. The approach accounts for a central feature of food demand under income growth-the shift from reliance on direct consumption of grains and other starchy staples into more diversified diets including edible oils and protein-rich animal products. This dietary upgrading imposes greater burdens on agricultural resources since production of more diversified, and particularly animal-based, diets requires much more agricultural output than plant-based diets (Fukase and Martin 2016; Rask and Rask 2011) . Figure 2a shows the estimated global CE consumption curve along with the actual changes in CE consumption between the beginning of the period (1992) and the end (2009), for the World Bank's regions. The CE consumption-income relationship is specified using the coefficient estimates in Fukase and Martin (Table 2, 2016) , which extends the food demand analysis developed by Rask and Rask (2011 ) to 1980 -2009 Under the World Bank country classification, all countries above a certain threshold Gross National Income (GNI) are classified as 'high' income countries (https://datahelpdesk.worldbank.org/knowledgebase/articles/906519). Only 'developing' countries are included in the 'regions', namely East Asia and the Pacific (EAP), Europe and Central Asia (ECA), South Asia (SA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and SubSaharan Africa (SSA). We classify countries into high and developing countries based on their 1992 income levels. This is because defining country groups at the end introduces systematic bias into growth rate comparisons by consistently subtracting better performers from the lower income group and adding better performers to the higher income group.
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In Fukase and Martin (2016) , this equation was also re-estimated adding the wedges between domestic and international prices created by Consumer Transfer Equivalents (Anderson and Nelgen 2013) . While this variable was statistically significant, its inclusion did not change the coefficients for the income variable, and substantially reduced the size of the estimating sample. Thus, we focus on the specification without the price distortion variable. where y is CE consumption per capita and x is Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita in 2005 constant prices. The estimated CE curve shows a concave relationship between CE food consumption and real income levels: with demand rising much more rapidly at low income levels when consumers are likely to spend a large proportion of increases in their incomes on food; CE consumption continues to increase as incomes grow, albeit at a slower rate, as consumers substitute foods with relatively high income elasticities (such as animal products) for cereals and tubers; and finally, CE consumption growth tapers off at higher levels of income (Rask and Rask 2011) .
For most regions, the levels of per capita CE consumption and their growth between 1992
and 2009 are consistent with the estimated curve in the relevant income ranges. Two exceptions were the ECA region and the high-income regions. In the ECA region, consumption of livestock products fell drastically following the move away from central planning, as the high cost of these products became evident (Rask and Rask 2004) . In high-income regions, there has been a shift away from the most resource-intensive meats, such as beef, and towards more efficiently-produced products such as poultry. In contrast, all non-ECA developing regions increased their consumption as their incomes grew. China's high economic growth saw a rapid increase in CE food consumption, with its per capita CE consumption increasing by about 70 percent over the period.
China's ongoing dietary shift, which reflects increasingly affluent life-styles induced by high income growth, appears to have been a major driver behind this change (Fukase and Martin 2016). 7 Figure 2a reveals much lower levels of income and CE consumption for the South Asia (SA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) regions than others. Despite the recent relatively high economic growth of the SA region, it continues to be the one in which food consumption in cereal equivalents is lowest, perhaps partly reflecting habit formation patterns of the type analyzed by Atkin (2013) and/or cultural factors (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012). 6 Standard errors are in brackets.
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For instance, the rise in China's imports of oilseeds (mainly soybeans), which was a major cause of China's agricultural trade deficit since the late 2000s, can be explained by the expansion of its modern livestock sector-which increased demand for protein feeds-along with rising consumer demand for vegetable oils (Fukase and Martin 2016) .
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Turning to calorie-based measures, Figure 2b shows the changes in food consumption between 1992 and 2009 by region with the global calorie consumption trend curve. The regional changes in calorie consumption are broadly in line with the global calorie trend line, revealing a concave relationship between income and food consumption albeit at a much lower level relative to the CE measure. Figure 2c shows the projected growth of demand for cereal equivalents and for calories on a comparable scale (Fukase and Martin 2016) . The figure shows that consumption of calories levels off much earlier and at a much lower level than consumption of cereal equivalents. This is because the latter measure reflects the increasing agricultural resource requirement resulting from dietary shifts which continue after calorie consumption stabilizes.
Past and Future Growth in Global Food Demand
In Table 1 , we decompose total growth in global food demand into parts due to population growth and to per capita consumption growth. The first three columns of To provide a benchmark, we focus on the so-called 'middle ground' scenario (SSP2) for both GDP and population projection data. Over the period 2009-2050, the SSP2 projection suggests annual world per capita GDP growth of 2.4 percent and world population growth of 0.68 percent per year. This implies annual global GDP growth of 3.1 percent. Figure 3a shows the growth of the global population in percent log-difference form. This illustrates clearly the rapid decline that has occurred, and is projected, in world population growth rates. However, measures of aggregate population growth mask differing regional population growth rates. Figure 3b An important feature of equation (1) is its implied pattern of income elasticities for total food demand. While income elasticities of demand for individual food items generally decline as income rises (Timmer, Falcon and Pearson 1983) , the shift in demand from starchy staples to livestock products may cause the income elasticity of total food demand measured in resource requirements to rise over some range. As shown by Gouel and Guimbard (2017) , the elasticity of demand for starchy staples is generally low, even for low-income consumers, while the elasticity of demand for livestock products is around 0.5, or higher, for low-to middle-income households.
The income elasticities used by Baldos and Hertel (2012, p 12) show a similar pattern, with the income elasticities of demand for livestock products generally two or more times as high as for crops in low-and middle-income countries. These elasticities are consistent with increasing income elasticities of demand for total food as the animal-product share of consumption rises over this range.
Considerable care is needed in interpreting estimates of the growth of total food demand.
If the focus is on the consumer, as in Gouel and Guimbard (2017) , where food is measured in calorie equivalents of food consumed, the weight on livestock products is likely to be much smaller than-as in this paper-when the focus is on the resource cost of food consumed and livestock products receive a much larger weight. A striking feature of this graph is the inverted-U shape of the aggregate income elasticity of demand for total food as income rises. At very low levels of income, where the dominant feature of dietary transformation is shifts from coarse grains and root crops to fine grains such as rice or wheat (Timmer et al. 1983 , p29), we estimate this income elasticity to be relatively low at around 0.2; it rises as income increases to middle-income levels; and peaks at around 0.42 at a PPP GDP of around $10,000; and then decreases as per capita income continues to grow. Evaluated at projected income levels in 2030, income elasticities in populous countries, such as India and Indonesia, are around their peak levels. While the elasticity is beginning to fall in key middleincome countries such as China and Turkey by 2030, this decline is relatively gradual, and income elasticities remain far above their levels in high-income countries. The elasticities for many SSA countries would still be on the rise in 2030. At higher income levels, the shift into livestock products is complete and the tendency for all income elasticities of demand for food to decline identified by Timmer et al. (1983, p57 ) results in elasticities of 0.1 or lower in high-income countries such as the United States.
This relationship between income elasticities and income levels suggests that income growth in middle-income countries-where food demand has begun its shift towards the animal products that are much more demanding in terms of resource requirements-may be particularly important for food demand growth measured in resource requirements rather than calories.
The last row of Table 1 Decomposing the projected food demand growth rate, we see an increase in the growth rate of per capita consumption-to 1.03 percent per year-and a sharp decline in the population growth rate, to 0.68 percent per year on average. Overall, Table 1 Baldos and Hertel (2016, p31) , using an indicator of food market pressure that includes developments on both the demand and supply sides, also find an increase in the importance of income relative to population growth, concluding that income growth will, for the first time in history, rival population growth as a source of demand for food.
Appendix Table A1 reports the twenty countries which contributed the most to the actual CE food demand increases for each of the past three decades, along with the projected top twenty 
Quantifying Convergence and Its Impact on Food Demand
As noted in the introduction, neoclassical growth theory predicts that the differences in per capita incomes across countries would tend to diminish over time. Baumol (1986) pointed out that higher economic growth rates should be expected in lower-income countries because technological advances flow from leaders to followers, allowing the countries that start with lower incomes to grow more rapidly than the leading countries. In economic terms, countries inside the production possibility frontier can improve their technology both by adopting new technologies and moving towards the best-practice frontier, while leading economies can only do so by developing new technologies.
Baldwin ( Some caution is needed in assessing the role of India in increasing food demand since India has not experienced as much food consumption increase as its high economic growth predicts. See Annex 2.1 in Alexandratos and Bruinsma (2012) for discussion.
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India, have grown much more rapidly in the past few decades relative to their own past, and to the developed countries. Accelerated growth in developing countries has resulted in a dramatic fall in the global GDP share of the Group of Seven (G7) countries, from almost two-thirds in 1990 to less than half today (Figure 23, Baldwin 2016) . Partly benefiting from a boom in commodity exports known as the 'commodity super-cycle', which was fueled by emerging economies' demands (Baldwin 2016) , SSA economies finally started to grow in the late 1990s and many of them have now reached Middle Income Country status as defined by the World Bank (Devarajan and Fengler 2013) .
To investigate whether developing countries have been experiencing higher per capita economic growth relative to higher income countries, we regress per capita annual GDP growth rates ( ) for country i on country i's initial log GDP ( ) relative to the country at the technological frontier ( ) which is assumed to be the United States ( -). (Leimbach et al. 2017 ).
The results in Table 2 show that the coefficients on the convergence terms for the final two decades of the last millennium are positive-implying unconditional divergence, rather than convergence-but not statistically significant. In contrast, the convergence term for 2001-2009 is negative and significant at the 2 percent level, suggesting countries' incomes started to converge in the first decade of the new millennium. The estimated rate of convergence of -0.43 percentage points in this period is, however, still only a quarter of the estimate of -1.57 percentage points for unconditional convergence among OECD members estimated by Dowrick and Nguyen (equation 1, 1989, p1018) . The last column of Table 2 14 To estimate the extent to which the income convergence embodied in SSP2 would affect growth in food demand, we perform a counterfactual simulation of uniform per capita growth in all countries at the rate that would result in world income being the same in 2050 as under SSP2.
World GDP, per capita GDP and population are specified as growing at 3.1 percent, 2.4 percent and 0.68 percent per year respectively in both scenarios. Figure 5 compares the food demand increases normalizing food demand in 2009 at 100 to facilitate the comparison. The results are decomposed by region with the ten countries that contribute most to the difference broken out individually.
The result reveals a striking difference in food demand changes coming from the different income growth patterns, as the resulting difference in income distribution in 2050 would lead to a larger CE food demand increase with the convergent SSP2 scenario (102 percent) relative to the non-convergent uniform scenario (78 percent). The accompanying table shows that developing countries as a group dominate the increase in food demand. Out of a 102 percent food demand increase, 95 percent is attributable to developing countries in the SSP2 scenario, while 70 percent of the 78 percent increase in food demand under the uniform growth scenario comes from them.
India, followed by China, Indonesia and Nigeria, are the largest contributors to the difference in the two scenarios, suggesting that whether these populous middle-income countries converge matters greatly for global food demand. As shown in Figure 4 , the large impact of income convergence for middle-income countries is partly attributable to their relatively high-income elasticities of food demand due to greater agricultural resource use needed for dietary upgrading. Figure 5 shows that high-income countries as a group would contribute modestly to global food demand increases (6.9 percent in SSP2 and 7.9 percent in the uniform scenario) partly due to slower population growth. While the counterfactual uniform scenario involves shifting world income from developing to high-income countries in 2050, the resulting increase in food demand in high-income countries is small (1.0 percentage point) due to the low income elasticities in these economies. Consistent with Cirera and Masset (2010) , our results show that a decrease in betweencountry income inequality resulting from convergence increases aggregate food demand, given the same level of aggregate income.
Convergence and Correlations in Forecasting Food Demand Growth
The analysis in the previous section is undertaken in levels, which avoids any approximation errors, but does not allow us to understand why the results are so different between the uniform and convergent scenarios or to decompose them between the effect of per capita food demand growth and that of population growth. To understand the sources of the much higher growth in food demand under the convergent SSP2 scenario, we turn to a share-weighted log-difference approach.
We define per capita food demand growth under the SSP2 scenario, as:
where Si is the share of country i in global food demand, βi is the income elasticity for country i, and yi is the rate of per capita economic growth in country i.
If the β and y variables are independent,
where = ∑ . and = ∑ .
If β and y are not independent, then we can use a second-order Taylor Series approximation around
. to obtain:
This equation makes clear that correlations between growth rates and income elasticities could affect food demand growth.
Another potentially important difference between the convergent growth scenario and the uniform growth scenario arises from the different weights involved in aggregating income and food demand. When we calculate the growth of global income, we are implicitly weighting by GDP shares, rather than by the food shares . In the uniform growth scenario, the uniform growth rate is = ∑ . where is the GDP weight of country i. The estimated food demand using this approach is therefore
Adding and subtracting food demand growth under the uniform growth scenario, , and recalling that . = [∑ . ], we obtain:
This shows that the difference in food demand growth between the SSP2 and the uniform growth scenarios can be decomposed into (i) the sum of the cross-products between growth rates and differentials between countries' income shares and food consumption shares [∑ ( − ). ], and (ii) the covariance between the income elasticities and the growth rates ∑ ( − )( − ).
When income growth is convergent, term (i) is likely to be positive. This is because lowincome countries tend to have higher shares of food demand in global food demand, relative to their income shares in global GDP, i. e., − > 0 and vice versa for high-income countries ( − < 0). Thus, faster income growth in low-income countries relative to their high-income counterparts would contribute positively to this term.
With income convergence, component (ii) resulting from the correlation between income growth and income elasticities ( ∑ ( − )( − )) is also positive, because the income elasticities of demand in developing countries tend to be above average, ( − > 0) and their income growth is also higher under convergence ( − > 0). High-income countries also tend to contribute positively to the term, since their elasticities of demand and growth rates tend to be below average, − < 0 and − < 0 respectively. However, the inverted-U shaped pattern of income elasticities shown in Figure 4 reduces this component, because some of the lowestincome economies have lower elasticities than the average.
Introducing global population growth into equation (6) yields:
where is global growth in food demand and is the food-share-weighted population growth rate.
The decomposition of food demand growth between 2009 and 2050 is summarized in Table   3 . Total global food demand growth between 2009 and 2050 turns out to be 70 percent in logdifference terms under the SSP2 scenario and 58 percent under the uniform growth scenario. These results are consistent with the 102 percent increase in food demand in the SSP2 scenario in the previous section ( .
-1 ≈ 1.02) and 78 percent increase in the uniform scenario ( .
-1 ≈ 0.78). While food-weighted population is found to grow by 23 percent in log-difference terms for both scenarios, food-weighted per capita demand growth under SSP2 of 48 percent in logdifference terms is found to be much greater than that of 36 percent in log-difference terms under the uniform growth scenario. The difference can be partly explained by the component coming from the correlation between income growth rates and the share differentials (7 percent in logdifference terms) and partly by the component resulting from the relationship between income growth and income elasticities (4.4 percent in log-difference terms).
The food-share-weighted decomposition of per capita demand growth and population growth in this section differs from that shown in Table 1 . The latter decomposition was populationshare-weighted for comparability with the existing literature, while the population growth rates in Table 3 are food-demand-share weighted to attribute correctly the impact of population growth on food demand. Dividing the 23 percent population impact in log-difference terms in Table 3 by the 41 years of the projection period reveals a lower estimate (0.56 percent per year) of the impact of population growth than in Table 1 (0.68 percent per year). 
Modeling Food Supply
While our primary focus in this paper is on economic convergence and food demand, an obvious question is how the increase in demand for food associated with convergence might be met, and what the implications for food prices might be. In this section, we develop a parsimonious representation of supply based on per capita GDP, land availability and labor supply. This model captures three important stylized facts-that agricultural output rises with a country's land endowment; that higher economy-wide productivity increases output; and that agricultural output increases by less than total output as the economy grows (Martin and Warr 1993) .
How rising food demand is met will be heavily influenced by the availability of agricultural land and other natural resources. During the same period, however, arable land per capita declined in all regions due to a combination of population growth and higher productivity of the land in use. The expansion of arable land for the LAC and EA regions appears to have been motivated in large measure by opportunities for exports, for instance, of soybeans from South America and of oil palm from Southeast Asia. In contrast, land expansion in the SSA region has been driven largely by growing needs for food and employment (Alexandratos and Bruinsma 2012) .
12 Fukase and Martin (2014) show a generally positive relationship between income and land productivity and between income and labor productivity (Figure 7ab ). Fuglie (2012) reports that agricultural production growth of 'developed' countries is primarily attributable to total factor productivity (TFP) growth while their agricultural input growth has been negative since the 1980s.
group, perhaps reflecting a high degree of fertilizer use, expansion of irrigated land, widespread use of multiple-cropping and the introduction of new seed varieties and other technological improvements. By contrast, cereal yields in the SSA region remain about one-fifth of those in highincome countries throughout the period. Overall, closing the 'yield gap' on currently cultivated areas appears to be one way of increasing global agricultural output in a sustainable manner (Foley et al. 2011) . Some economists argue that the fragmentation and offshoring of production associated with the New Globalization (Baldwin 2016) may offer new opportunities for poor farmers to be integrated into the global production network. The exponent on the income per capita term is positive as higher agricultural productivity, associated with the higher economy-wide productivity that increases income levels, raises agricultural production. The positive relationship between income and agricultural production is likely to reflect not only higher yields per hectare but also better infrastructure and marketing know-how associated with higher income. The exponent on the agricultural land is positive as land-abundant countries tend to produce and export land-intensive commodities such as agricultural products.
Using the parameter values from Equation (8), Figure 8 shows the estimated CE production curves evaluated at different land endowments of selected countries, namely, the United States (land abundant), Japan (land scarce) and China (relatively land scarce) together with the global CE consumption curve (adopted from Figure 10abc For instance, by joining supermarket value chains, small farmers in Madagascar benefited from spillovers from the productivity of technology for rice (Minten, Randrianarison and Swinnen 2009). 14 Standard errors are in brackets.
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Following Rask and Rask (2011) , hectares of agricultural land per capita are defined as a sum of arable land, land in permanent crops, and one-third of land in permanent pasture. 20 that agricultural production per capita rises with income; that the shape of the production curve is concave, but the curvature is much flatter than that of the consumption curve, revealing close to a linear relationship between income and production; and that countries with higher land endowments tend to produce more food given the same level of income. The figure also suggests that land abundant countries such as the United States tend to produce more food than they consume and to be exporters of food at almost all income levels. In contrast, land-scarce countries such as Japan are likely to consume more food than they produce, being food importers throughout their income levels. For relatively land scarce countries such as China, the concavity of the consumption curve implies that their consumption growth may be faster than production growth for a wide range of income, which in turn may contribute to rising net imports. 
Projections to 2050
Using the intermediate PPP GDP 16 and population projections for 2030 and 2050 from the SSP database (SSP2) (Leimbach et al. 2017) , we perform simulation exercises to estimate how CE consumption and production might evolve in the future. We use projections of arable land kindly provided by Jelle Bruinisma, which reflect the detailed estimates underlying Alexandratos and 16 One caveat in our analyses is that we rely our GDP projections on the SSP database and do not consider the potential growth slowdown identified by recent research (e.g., Laborde and Martin 2016; World Bank October 2016 for SSA). Bruinsma (2012) . While there are significant variations in the accuracy of regional projections, 17 models of this type tend to perform better at the aggregate level McCalla and Revoredo 2001; and Schneider et al. 2011) . We therefore focus on aggregate measures in this section. The CE food consumption and production in 2030 and 2050 are estimated using the projection data and the parameter values in equations (1) and (8) Since there is an overestimate of CE consumption and an underestimate of CE production in the initial year, we remove these residuals by adjusting them multiplicatively so that initial CE consumption and production match the actual 2009 CE consumption and production. We apply the same multiplicative terms for the years 2030 and 2050 so that this adjustment preserves the percentage changes. There exists a slight gap between actual CE consumption and production in 2009 (about 0.9 percent) due to the missing countries in our sample. We adjust initial supply and demand at the mid-point of the actual supply and demand gap. To measure the extent to which the convergent assumption embodied in the SSP2 scenario is affecting food demand, Figure 9b and the second column of Table 4 report the results of the counterfactual uniform growth scenario, taking global income to the same level in 2050 as the SSP2 scenario. This implies annual global GDP growth of 3.1 percent in both scenarios. The move to a uniform growth scenario causes a much larger decline in food demand growth (from 102 percent to 78 percent) than that in food supply (from 112 to 104 percent). The resulting gap between supply and demand of 13.9 percent in log-difference terms would lead to a price decline of 12.0 percent. Comparing the results between SSP2 and uniform growth scenarios, the net effect on prices of moving from the uniform scenario to the SSP2 scenario is to increase prices by 7.9 percentage points. The growth convergence inherent in the SSP2 scenario is therefore partly offsetting what would otherwise have been substantial downward pressure on world food prices.
The differential GDP growth rates embodied in SSP2 scenario may reflect features of the data set other than convergence. If, for instance, it reflected a bias towards more rapid growth in the middle-income countries with the highest income elasticities, it would generate more rapid growth in global demand than one with the highest growth rate among the countries with the lowest incomes. To focus more directly on the convergence issue, we construct an alternative scenario in which country growth rates relative to the United States are determined solely by the convergence rate estimated for the SSP2 projection ('Pure convergence' scenario). Specifically, each country's annual growth rate is computed as 1.2 -0.85 [ -] where is the initial log GDP for country i, is the initial log GDP of the United States and 1.2 is the projected growth rate for the United States in SSP2. Since this scenario would lead to a lower world GDP growth of 2.7 percent, in parallel to the base comparison, we construct a uniform scenario in which the world economies grow at the uniform rate of 2.7 percent. The results are shown in Figures 9cd and in Columns 3-4 in Table 4 . Similar to the SSP2 scenario, the impact of convergence is larger on the
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The demand and supply elasticities implied in the global agricultural models tend to vary substantially (Table 3 , . The emulator elasticities are: for food demand (-0.29), for the response of output due to substitution between land and other inputs (0.51), and for land supply (0.36). Together they imply a flexibility of price response to a proportional gap between supply and demand in the order of 0.86 [ . .≈ 0.86]. Thus, the gap of around 4.8 percent in log-difference terms between our supply and demand projections implies a price decline of about 4.1 percent.
demand side relative to the supply side, albeit to a lesser degree. The net effect of the convergence is to increase prices by 6.6 percentage points, or slightly less than the SSP2 scenario.
We also consider higher rates of convergence, such as might occur with higher rates of economic integration between rich and poor countries (Chapter 10, Baldwin 2016). Figures 9ef and Columns 5-6 of Table 4 explore what would happen if growth rates were to converge as rapidly as among the OECD countries between 1950 and 1985 (Dowrick and Nguyen 1989) ('Strong convergence' scenario). This scenario would result in an average annual world GDP growth rate of 3.8 percent. The increase in food demand of 134 percent under the strong convergence scenario is substantially larger than that under the comparable uniform growth scenario (92 percent). A much greater impact of convergence in demand than in supply would result in the net impact on prices of 11.6 percentage points, which is nearly 50 percent higher relative to the SSP2 scenario.
A question arises whether our results might be driven mainly by the outperformance of two populous Asian giants, namely China and India. We repeat a simulation assuming the economies converge at the same rate as that embodied in SSP2, but excluding China and India from our sample (Figures 9gh and the last two columns of Table 4 ). The qualitative results are essentially unchanged and our results appear to be robust regardless of the inclusion of China and India.
Overall, we find a robust pattern that the impact of income convergence on world food demand is substantially larger than the impact on supply. As a result, income convergence is likely to contribute to upward pressure on food prices. However, in all our scenarios, the pressure on food demand caused by convergence appears to be manageable, partially offsetting a baseline trend towards falling world food prices to 2050.
Conclusions
Using a simple econometric model focusing on the key drivers (income growth, population growth, dietary change, productivity growth and land endowment), this paper explores world food demand and supply towards the middle of the century. We focus on analyzing the implications of income convergence in influencing global food demand. We aggregate food into a single commodity measured by resource-based cereal equivalents (CE) (Rask and Rask 2011; Yotopoulos 1985) , which allow us to evaluate the differential growth rates of consumption and production of food at different levels of income. Because of the much higher costs of producing livestock products, this resource-cost-based measure of food demand is much more responsive to income growth than alternative measures based on final calories consumed.
Using the GDP and population projections from the SSP2 data set, we find that CE food The implications of income convergence for food demand seems timely, given the apparent reversal of fortunes in moving from the Great Divergence (Pritchett 1997) to the Great Convergence which started around 1990 (Baldwin 2016) . We find that the coefficient for unconditional income convergence in our sample countries was not significant in the 1980s or 1990s, but became significant in the first decade of the 2000s, when developing countries grew, on average, much more rapidly than the developed countries. We also find that the rate of income convergence using the middle-ground GDP projections from the SSP database (SSP2) between 2009 and 2050 is about twice as rapid as the last decade, although still about half the rate estimated by Dowrick and Nguyen (1989) for the OECD countries in their post-war golden age of 1950-
1985.
A series of simulation results reveal that the impact of convergence on food demand increase can be substantial. The rise in demand of our base scenario (102 percent), which embodies the assumption of income convergence from SSP2, is about one-third greater than that under the counterfactual non-convergent growth scenario (78 percent). The regional decomposition shows that developing countries as a group dominate the increase in food demand and that their income convergence does matter. We find that convergence by middle-income countries, especially such populous countries as India, China, Indonesia and Nigeria, is particularly important for global food demand. This is partly due to the inverted-U shaped pattern of income elasticities for aggregate food demand, with middle-income countries experiencing the largest income elasticities due to their dietary upgrading towards more resource demanding products.
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On the supply side, our base projection suggests that food production would increase by 112 percent, slightly faster than the CE consumption increase of 102 percent. The impact of convergence on the supply side is much more muted than on the demand side, suggesting that convergence-if it continues to occur-will contribute to upward pressure on world food prices.
Using the key elasticity values from , we see the pattern of deviations from uniform growth in the SSP2 scenario pushing up food prices by nearly 8 percentage points. Such increases are relative to a baseline which, like , involves falling real food prices, so meeting this demand appears to be manageable if agricultural productivity growth continues in line with historical patterns.
Finally, while our minimalist approach turns out to be useful in highlighting the interplay of key drivers of food demand, supply and prices, our model is subject to a number of limitations.
In particular, our price baseline is based on an assumption that agricultural productivity will continue to rise steadily in line with past growth. Negative productivity shocks coming from, for instance, climate change, reductions in agricultural research investment and environmental degradation, would negatively affect food production capacities. On the other hand, good policies and actions at different levels, perhaps those envisioned in the SDGs such as responsible consumption and production, climate action and sustainable management of land and water, may counter-balance likely negative impacts on production. 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-1997 av. 1998-2002 av. 2003-2007 av. 2008-2012av 1992-2012 1992-2012 1992-1997 av. 1998-2002 av. 2003-2007 av. 2008-2012av The cumulative share exceeding 100 reflects the fact that some countries experienced CE food demand decrease. Overall, our model predicts past global CE consumption relatively well. The predicted CE consumption per capita and per year for 1992 is 0.92 tons, which is reasonably close to actual CE consumption of 0.88 tons, while that for the year 2009 is 1.07 tons (relative to the actual 0.98 tons). However, the model performance varies depending on the regions. The table attached to Figure A1 compares actual and predicted per capita CE consumption changes between 1992 and 2009 by regions. Our model estimates the changes in CE consumption reasonably well for China and the EA (other than China), MENA and SSA regions. However, in terms of the SA region, the actual CE consumption increase has been much smaller than their income level predicts. For the ECA region, the actual CE consumption in 1992 (1.4 tons) was much higher than their income level predicts in the aftermath of the dissolution of former Soviet Union (1.1 tons), but it decreased to 1.3 tons in 2009, at the level that our model predicts (1.3 tons). For the highincome countries as a group, while predicted and actual CE consumption were very close in 1992 to each other, at 1.8 tons and 1.9 tons respectively, our model does not predict the actual decline in their CE consumption mainly resulting from a dietary shift from CE intensive red meat (e.g., beef) to relatively feed efficient lean meat (e.g., chicken). Figure A2 repeats the same calculation on the CE production side. The results show that equation (8) predicts CE production reasonably well, with predicted CE production of 0.82 tons (relative to the actual CE production of 0.89) for 1992 and 0.93 tons (relative to the actual 0.99 tons) respectively. Between 1992 and 2009, the LAC region increased its CE production much faster than its land endowment and income level predict, mainly driven by the high performance of Brazil. The EA region, mainly Southeast Asian countries, as well as China, also outperformed given their income levels and land endowments. CE production of ECA and high-income countries as a group decreased, perhaps reflecting the transition to a market-oriented system and a shift in diets to relatively CE efficient food respectively. Godfray et al. (2010) show that global production of chicken, and to a lesser extent, that of pigs has risen substantially since 1960, while the production of cattle and sheep has stagnated ( Figure 1B , Godfray et al. 2010) .
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Using the estimated coefficients reported in equation (8), Figure A3 and the attached table decompose the change in CE production into the contribution of the change in agricultural land endowment and that of the change in productivity proxied by GDP. As agricultural land per capita decreased between 1992 and 2009, the contribution of land change to CE production per capita is negative. However, the much faster increase in productivity associated with GDP growth appears to have outweighed the negative impacts of reduced land endowment, resulting in an increase in CE production per capita. The qualitative result is consistent with the insight from the SIMPLE model (Hertel 2011; which suggests a tradeoff between the intensive and extensive margins of agricultural supply, i.e., the need for cropland area expansion can be reduced, if yields can be increased at a sufficiently rapid pace to meet the demand. 
